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 The impact of conflict on the well-being of civilians is stronger near to the conflict 
zone. 
 A major channel of the impact is through negative expectations about financial well-
being. 
 The conflict worsened the financial well-being of females more strongly than that of 
males. 
 There is a significant increase in chronic diseases in Ukraine over a longer period. 




This paper investigates the contemporaneous effect of conflict on civilians living 
outside of the conflict zone. Applying a multi-dimensional concept of well-being, it uses two 











affected the financial well-being and health of people in both countries. We find that the 
conflict significantly worsened financial well-being in both countries. The impact mostly 
operates by worsening expectations about financial well-being and is inversely related to the 
distance from the conflict zone. Our analysis indicates an increase in chronic diseases in 
Ukraine over a longer period. Mental health is negatively impacted in both countries at the 
earlier stages of the conflict. However, in Russia this effect is significant only in the region 
bordering the conflict zone, while in Ukraine it is significant in regions farther away from the 
conflict zone. 
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The impact of military conflict on the well-being of a population has attracted the 
attention of scholars from different fields for a long time. Most of these studies have focused 
on the effects of conflict on the combatants and on the civil population within the conflict 
zone. However, even a highly localized conflict may have an impact on a much larger 
territory as a result of the migration of a displaced population, the destruction of 
communication and supply chains, and psychological warfare. Research into the effects of 
conflict on civilians outside the conflict zone, and the channels (direct and indirect) and 
intensity of these effects is becoming more important because of a significant increase in the 
exposure of civilians to conflicts.  
Many scholars take the view that the impact of military conflicts on civilian 
populations has increased dramatically; for instance, at the beginning of the 20th century, 85 to 
90% of casualties were military, whereas by the late 1990s 80 to 90% of all casualties were 
civilian (Collier, 2003; Kaldor, 2006). However, some argue that methodological differences 
in counting casualties and high levels of measurement error cast doubt on this apparently 
dramatic shift towards civilian casualties (Roberts, 2010). Still, it would be fair to say that the 
advent of powerful and technologically advanced weapons and the transmission of threats of 
violence through the mass media and social networks have significantly increased the levels 
of anxiety and fear among the general population affected by modern armed conflicts and 
negatively affected the overall well-being of civilians (Landau et al., 1998). As a result, 
military violence persistently affects the mental health of not just the civilians living inside 
the conflict zones (Cesur et al., 2013), but also of those who experience it through daily 
stressors such as changes in social and material conditions, the destruction of social networks 
and the mass displacement of the civilian population (Miller and Rasmussen, 2010). 
The sizable literature on the impact of military conflicts on macroeconomic outcomes 











economic growth, per capita income, exports and external debt (Collier, 1999; Stewart et al., 
2001) and also on the positive effects on economic growth leadership, managerial and 
organizational skills that are seen in the aftermath of war (Koubi, 2005; Bellows and Miguel, 
2009; Miguel and Roland, 2011; Coupe and Obrizan, 2016a). There is a growing body of 
literature that studies the microeconomics of conflicts (Verwimp et al., 2018) where the 
analysis of micro data gives evidence of a negative, long-run impact of armed conflicts on 
health, education and labor market outcomes of war veterans, the internally displaced 
population and others directly affected by military violence (Ghobarah et al., 2003; Blattman 
and Miguel, 2010; Kondylis, 2010; Miller and Rasmussen, 2010; Calderón-Mejía et al., 
2015). 
This paper estimates the contemporaneous impact of military violence on civilians’ 
well-being, using micro-level individual survey data to study the case of the Russian-
Ukrainian hybrid war. We use two large individual-level datasets, the Ukrainian Household 
Budget Survey (UHBS) and the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), over a 
time period that covers the time before and during the conflict (2012-2016). Unlike Coupe 
and Obrizan (2016b), who looked at the conflict using data from the Kyiv International 
Institute of Sociology (KIIS), we chose UHBS for the analysis of Ukraine for several reasons. 
First, UHBS is the largest individual-level dataset for Ukraine, including around 7000-8000 
observations per year (the data from KIIS includes only 2000 observations). Second, this data 
contains detailed information about the respondents’ economic circumstances (household 
income and expenditure), health, and their subjective evaluation of their financial situation, 
thereby allowing us to analyse different domains of well-being. Third, the data is 
representative at the regional level, while the KIIS dataset is not.  
Well-being reflects many aspects of peoples’ lives, capturing a wide range of their 
experience and perceptions. Therefore, it can tell us more than the objective economic 











attempts to evaluate the effect of military violence on civilians’ well-being generated 
inconclusive and contradictory results. A cross-country study by Welsch (2008) found that 
armed conflicts, with their concomitant psychological effects and reductions in income, 
significantly decrease life satisfaction. Moreover, the number of victims, as well as the change 
in the numbers of victims over time, significantly affects the life satisfaction of the population 
even after the conflict has ended. Research into life satisfaction in post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina showed that personal satisfaction varies with the intensity of violence 
experienced. War-related trauma – loss of friends and relatives, damaged houses – had a 
negative, significant and lasting impact on life satisfaction (Shemyakina and Plagnol, 2013).  
At the same time, Van Praag et al., (2010) did not find any significant changes in life 
satisfaction and financial well-being before, during and after the military conflict between 
Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.  
Unlike previous research that uses a single-item measure of well-being (whether it be 
life satisfaction, happiness or a quality of life evaluation), the measurement of well-being in 
this paper is multi-dimensional because it has been shown that peoples’ overall life 
satisfaction is affected by many aspects, such as their health, employment or material 
resources (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). To capture the whole picture, it is important to 
take into account objective conditions and subjective assessments across different dimensions 
(Stiglitz et al., 2009). Positive and negative changes in well-being, measured along different 
dimensions, may cancel each other out, leading to no change in the measurable index overall 
despite profound and deep problems associated with certain dimensions that require 
immediate policy interventions (Gosling et al., 2003). Using multi-dimensional measures 
raises questions concerning the choice and relative importance of the dimensions one should 
consider. This paper relies on Benjamin et al. (2014), who suggested using people’s 
preferences, rather than ‘fundamental aspects’ of well-being in order to determine the most 











financial well-being (“FWB”), which Russians and Ukrainians both mentioned in UHBS and 
RLMS as the most valued components of their overall well-being. 
Another important contribution of this paper is its examination of conflict from both 
sides of the border: that of the country that initiated and supported the conflict, and the 
country where the conflict takes place. The conflict could affect the opposing sides in 
different ways since the losses for one country may translate into gains for the other. The 
World Happiness Report shows opposite trends in life evaluation for Russians and Ukrainians 
during the conflict. According to Helliwell et al. (2013, 2017), Ukraine lost 44 positions in the 
overall country happiness rankings (from 87th place in 2010-2012 to 132nd place in 2014-
2016). At the same time, Russia jumped from 68th place to 49th during the same period, even 
though the conflict led to a deterioration in Russia’s economic situation and broke the social 
ties between two close neighbors.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on the effect of conflict on health. A 
substantial number of papers that investigate the implications of conflicts on health are 
focused on the long-run effects of a conflict (Alderman et al., 2006; Bundervoet et al., 2009; 
Bozzoli and Brück, 2010, Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2014). Our aim is to research the 
contemporaneous effects of military violence on the health of civilians. Military conflicts can 
impact the health of even those who do not experience violence directly, whether that be 
through the spread of communicable diseases during the course of forced migration flows 
(Toole and Waldman, 1997; Roberts et al., 2001) or the exacerbation of pre-existing diseases 
that went untreated because of the hostilities (Gustafson et al., 2001). Therefore, even 
localized conflicts may negatively influence the health of the population of a much wider 
area. It is important to analyse how fast and how wide the impact on health spreads. 
Our identification strategy is based on the difference-in-difference methodology (DD) 
adjusted for the intensity of treatment, which is inversely related to distance from the conflict 











and that the border dampens its effects considerably. Whilst for Russians the negative effect 
was seen only during the first year of the conflict, for Ukrainians it was present for all three 
years since 2014. The effect is inversely related to the distance from the conflict zone and 
mainly works through the deterioration in financial well-being. Our results show that the 
negative effect of the conflict on expectations about future financial well-being goes beyond 
the shock experienced by the individual’s current income. Satisfaction with one’s financial 
situation does not mirror the impact on income because people adjust their needs to their 
financial means. Negative financial expectations do, however, lead to real effects on the 
current macroeconomic situation through delayed investment decisions, the devaluation of 
local currency, and increased distrust in the banking system (i.e. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Bloom et al., 2007, Backer et al., 2016).  
The impact of the conflict on health gives a rather mixed and nuanced picture. Mental 
health is negatively impacted in both countries at the earlier stages of the conflict. However, 
in Russia this effect is significant only in the region that borders on the conflict zone, while in 
Ukraine it significantly affects those living farther away from the conflict zone. This may be 
related to the negative correlation between the proportion of ethnic Russians in the population 
and to the distance from Donbas – a high proportion of the population living close to the 
conflict region may have welcomed the secession of Crimea and the rising Russian influence, 
whereas people from the more remote regions were strongly against it.1 Physical health 
deteriorated in the third year of the conflict in Ukraine only, with the effect stronger for those 
civilians living closer to the conflict zone. Perhaps this pattern indicates that the effect of the 
conflict on physical health occurs with longer lags, while mental health is impacted earlier 
and recovers more quickly, since people adjust to their changing environment.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information about the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
                                                            











methodology. Section 4 describes the data used in our analysis. Section 5 presents the results, 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Russia-Ukraine hybrid war: Background on the conflict and its aggregate 
economic impact 
At the end of March 2014, pro-Russian protesters occupied government buildings in 
the Southern and Eastern parts of Ukraine and called for political and economic autonomy.2 
The catalysts for these actions were the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the coordinated 
effort of a paramilitary group led by a Russian national, Igor Strelkov, who took control of 
Slavyansk, a town 100 kilometres north of Donetsk.3 
Later, in the summer of 2014, the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics were 
declared. The National Security and Defence Committee of Ukraine dubbed the self-
proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics terrorist organisations and declared the 
start of an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in Donbas.4 Since 2014, ATO has transformed into a 
full-scale military conflict. According to the official data, from April 2014 to December 2016 
almost 10,000 people were killed in the Eastern part of Ukraine and 22,779 were injured 
(OHCHR, 2016), while 1.7 million people were displaced (International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, IDMC). According to the Ministry of Defence, 50% of industrial factories 
in the Donetsk region and 80% in the Lugansk region are currently controlled by pro-Russian 
separatist forces. 
Donbas, the industrial heartland of Ukraine, became devastated. Most enterprises were 
cut off from both their established supply chains and the world markets due to military 
                                                            
2 Pro-Russian forces organized protests in the Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhia 
regions. However, they succeeded in overthrowing the local governments only in Donetsk and Lugansk. 
3 See, for example, “Russia’s Igor Strelkov: I Am Responsible for War in Eastern Ukraine”, Nov 21, 2014, by 
Anna Dolgov, Moscow Times 
4 Donbas (Donetsk and Lugansk regions) is an industrial region that plays an important role in the economy of 
Ukraine. Donbas is Ukraine’s industrial heartland, the centre of its production of metal and coal and the 
machine-building industries. It accounts for 16% of the country’s GDP and a quarter of its exports. 6.45 million 











fighting, damage to railway and electricity lines, and the new de facto border established 
between the occupied part of Donbas and the rest of Ukraine. Broken linkages and the 
sanctions imposed by the government against the separatists also negatively hit the Ukrainian 
economy. For instance, factories that were dependent on their supply of coal from Donbas had 
to shut down until they had found an alternative supplier (Adarov et al., 2015). This negative 
shock pushed the already sluggish Ukrainian economy to the brink of collapse. The local 
currency devalued against the USD by 50% in 2014 and by another 37% in 2015. GDP per 
capita dropped by 1.1% in 2014 and by 9.5% in 2015 (see Figure 1). 
The hybrid war by Russia against Ukraine was carried out through separatist proxies 
in the Donbas region. The rebel groups were supplied with weapons and ammunition via the 
Russian-Ukrainian border, which, since 2014, was controlled by the separatists. In response to 
the Russian intervention in Ukraine, a number of Western countries introduced several rounds 
of sanctions. Russia, in turn, responded with counter-sanctions, banning food products from 
the EU countries. Skyrocketing military expenses, the disintegration of economic ties with 
Ukraine, the high economic burden of the government’s support for Crimea and the so-called 
Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, and the fall in oil prices all combined with the 
economic sanctions and counter-sanctions to bring growth in Russia into negative numbers 
for the first time since the financial crisis: -1% in 2014 and -3% in 2015. Additionally, the 
Russian rouble was devalued by almost 50 % and inflation increased to 15.5% in 2015. 
 
<insert Figure 1 here> 
 
The existing literature on the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war has estimated the impact 
of the conflict separately for Russia and Ukraine. Guriev and Melnikov (2016), who 
investigated the effect of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine on social capital in Russia, found that 











from the conflict zone. Coupe and Obrizan (2016b) looked at the conflict from the opposite 
side of the border. They examined the impact of the conflict on happiness in Ukraine and 
concluded that the average level of happiness declined only in the conflict zone, while 
happiness in the other regions did not change. This result was explained by (i) the lack of 
empathy of the European-oriented population in the Western regions towards the pro-Russian 
population in the Eastern regions, and (ii) by the prolonged duration of the conflict in that 
people simply adjusted to living with it. 
 
2. Methodology 
3.1 Identification strategy 
To identify the effect of the conflict on well-being, we use the DD methodology, 
modified to account for the peculiarities of our data. For a valid inference, DD needs a 
balanced randomized sample with common trends for the control and treatment groups. Our 
data does not include the population of the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions and Crimea in 2014-2016. In particular, two of the largest cities of Donbas, 
Donetsk and Lugansk, are not covered by the 2014-2016 surveys. Moreover, the population of 
the non-occupied parts of the Donbas region out-migrated in large numbers to escape the 
conflict. The likelihood of migration varied by the differing levels of financial situation, age, 
gender, occupation and education. Therefore, “treatment” in the conflict zone was not 
random. These data deficiencies and the sample selection problem preclude us from using the 
standard methodology. To overcome this, we make two modifications to the DD analysis. 
First, using the distance from Donetsk (the capital of the self-declared People’s Republic of 











intensity of the impact of military violence on populations from different regions.5 It is 
reasonable to assume that the population that lives closer to the conflict zone will be affected 
more by the conflict than the residents in remoter regions. We interact distance with the 
timing of the conflict as the source of exogenous variation to study how people from different 
regions of Ukraine experienced the conflict. To exclude the endogeneity problem arising from 
the migration of the most mobile population to farther away from the conflict, we look at how 
the conflict influenced the components of well-being for population groups with varying 
levels of mobility. Second, as an alternative model specification, the population of Rostov in 
Russia6 is selected as the treated group and the standard DD analysis is performed. 
Another limitation of DD is the assumption of parallel trends for the treated and 
control groups. We test this assumption by looking at the trends prior to the conflict and 
testing whether they were different for the treated and control groups. We also perform a 
placebo test, in which distance to Minsk – the capital of Belarus – is taken to measure the 
intensity of the effect, thereby checking that our results are not driven by unobserved factors 
unrelated to the conflict. 
 
3.2 Empirical model 
The modified DD model is given by 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡  +  𝛽2 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑟) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡 ×
ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑟) +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛿  + 𝜇𝑅 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a Well-Being (“WB”) domain of an individual 𝑖 from region r at time 𝑡, 
captured by one of the measures of financial well-being or health that are described below. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
                                                            
5 Apart from this justification in terms of data availability, the chosen approach may be reasonable in its own 
right. It is simply a continuous treatment assumption, which is quite common (see Rehdanz et al., 2015, in the 
context of the Fukushima disaster). We would like to thank a referee who pointed this out. 
6 Ukraine has a border with three Russian oblasts (provinces). However, RLMS has conducted surveys only in 
the Rostov region, which is located nearest to some heavy battles, and there was evidence of building-up the 











is the set of individual-specific variables (age, education, occupation, etc.) for individual 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡 is a dummy for the conflict, which takes the value 1 if the year is 2014 or 
later, and 0 otherwise. ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑟) is the distance from Donetsk to the main 
administrative city of region 𝑟. The coefficient 𝛽3 is the main coefficient of interest, which 
shows whether increasing the distance from Donetsk reduces the impact of the conflict on 
WB. It is worth mentioning that there are some studies in the academic literature that also 
used the DD to measure the intensity of changes. Acemoglu et al. (2004) used mobilisation 
rates in different states as the interaction term and estimated the effect of World War II on the 
female labour supply in the US. Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) used the degree of destruction of 
cities to measure the long-run impact of the Air Force’s bombing during WWII on health and 
labour market outcomes. Guriev and Melnikov (2016) used the distance from Donetsk and 
Lugansk to measure the impact of the Russia-Ukraine hybrid war on social capital. 
Apart from the conflict, there can be other factors that influence respondents’ self-
estimation of financial well-being (“FWB”) and health. The economic situation in Ukraine 
started to deteriorate before the military conflict, as seen in the devaluation of the local 
currency, negative trends in the global markets for metals (the main export item of Ukraine), 
high energy prices, and the loss of trade links with Russia (Coupe and Obrizan, 2016b). It is 
clear that the Eastern regions, oriented towards trading with Russia, suffered more than the 
Western regions, which had closer trade relationships with Europe (Zhukov, 2016). 
Moreover, as shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix B, regions differ in their ethnic mix, which 
may affect personal well-being domains related to health. Likewise, the economic situation in 
Russia was severely impacted by the decline in oil prices in 2014-2016 and by a series of 
economic sanctions. These circumstances may affect the evaluation of the individual’s FWB 
and are not direct consequences of the conflict, although the conflict worsened the situation. 
Therefore, the macro-regional fixed effects (𝜇𝑅), which capture the strength of 











Russia and Ukraine are larger than oblasts and regions. In Ukraine, they include North, West, 
South and Bordering Donbas.7 For Russia, we use the official division of the Russian regions 
by Federal Districts. Since the conflict has already lasted for several years, we also add time 
fixed effects (𝜇𝑡), to capture the common shocks that hit Ukraine and Russia each year. 
Finally, 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Further, for the Russian sample we use Rostov (located very 
close to the conflict zone) as the treated group and run a standard DD model as given by 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡  =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡  +  𝛾2 𝑅𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑣𝑟 +  𝛾3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑣𝑟 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜋 + 𝜓𝑟 + 𝜓𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
3. Data 
We use the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (UHBS) in 2012-2016, which 
comprises a repeated cross-section of micro data on Ukrainian households conducted by the 
State Statistics Office of Ukraine. UHBS reflects the composition of the population in 
Ukraine8, as well as the composition of the population in the regions. It contains information 
about individual characteristics (age, gender, education), economic circumstances (household 
income, expenditure), health, and a subjective evaluation of the financial situation.9 
To assess the effect of the conflict on the population of the Russian Federation we 
employ the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2012 to 2016. RLMS is a 
series of nationally representative surveys, which contain detailed information about 
individuals’ characteristics, health status and subjective evaluation of different aspects of life. 
Additionally, RLMS reports household-level expenditure and income. For this study, we 
                                                            
7 Ukrainian regions were split into macro regions, based on the military administrative division. Donbas includes 
the Donetsk and Lugansk regions; Bordering Donbas includes the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhja 
regions that border Donbas; South (Vinnitsa, Kropyvnitskiy, Odessa, Mykolaiv and Kherson regions); North 
(Chernigiv, Zhytomir, Sumi, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kyev); West (Volin, Zakarpatskiy, Ivano-Frankivskiy, 
Ternopilskiy, Lvivskiy, Rivne, Khemelnitskiy, Chernivetskiy). 
8 From 2014 this data does not include information about Crimea and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk 
People’s Republics. 
9  The survey that estimates the health of the population was not conducted in 2013. Therefore, data from 2012 
and 2014-2016 are used for the analysis of health. Financial self-evaluation data are not available for 2012. As a 











consider only the European part of Russia, located closer to Ukraine. We suppose that the 
effect of the conflict on the Far East and Siberia is minimal and thus including those regions 
would add confusion to our analysis.10 
The conflict started in March 2014. For both datasets, the 2014 rounds were conducted 
in the 4th quarter.11 Our treatment period therefore starts with the 2014 surveys and continues 
with the 2015 and 2016 surveys. In our analysis, we focus on the sample of people who are 16 
or older. The impact of conflict on the WB of children is a very important topic that requires 
different treatment to that of the adult population. We therefore leave it for future research. 
 
4.1 Measuring financial well-being 
To measure financial well-being, we use both objective and subjective aspects. 
Objective FWB is measured as the real total household income – the sum of all household 
income sources net of taxes and deflated by the consumer price index. To evaluate subjective 
FWB, we use two self-reported variables. The first variable is the “ability to make ends meet” 
(“AEM”), which is very commonly used to measure financial well-being (Angel et al., 2003; 
Arber et al., 2013). It takes a value of 1 if the person had enough income to buy food and 0 
otherwise. RLMS does not contain questions that can be used to measure this ability to make 
ends meet. Thus, for the Russian sample we use a variable that measures “financial 
satisfaction”, which is also used as an indicator of subjective financial well-being in other 
studies (i.e. Zimmerman, 1995). It takes a value of 1 if the person is satisfied and 0 otherwise. 
To evaluate how secure a person feels about their financial future, we use the self-reported 
“expectation about financial well-being” (“FWB”).  It takes a value of 1 if the person expects 
                                                            
10 We do not consider the panel dimension of the RLMS for our study, since it does not track people who moved 
houses. This deficiency of the RLMS precludes the use of individual fixed effects, because distance for the 
individuals in the sample does not vary over time. 












improvements and 0 otherwise. More detailed information about these measures is presented 
in Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
We distinguish between subjective FWB and income, because income alone does not 
reflect the ability to meet one’s needs (Zimmerman and Katon, 2005) and has a different 
dynamic to expectations about the financial situation (Angel et al., 2003; Joo and Grable, 
2004). Current real income varies with short-term fluctuations in prices and economic 
activity. Expectations are more sensitive to the arrival of new information about the conflict 
(including the influence of fake news, information warfare, etc.) and may shape the 
investment decisions of individuals.  This naturally has implications for policymakers. 
 
4.2 Measuring health 
Regarding health, we make a distinction between physical and mental health, because 
we expect the conflict’s effect on them to be subject to different mechanisms, timing and 
duration. The effect on physical health may develop later, but with longer and more severe 
effects, leading to disabilities and chronic diseases (Alderman et al., 2006; Palmer et al., 
2016). Conversely, the effect on mental health is more acute in the short run, but the longer 
the conflict continues, the more likely it is that people will adjust to their new situation 
(Shemyakina and Plagnol, 2013; Miller and Rasmussen, 2010). 
Previous studies point out that the spread of communicable diseases arising from 
forced migration flows during conflict increases a number of chronic diseases and disabilities 
(Toole and Waldman, 1997; Roberts et al., 2017). As an indicator of changes in physical 
health, we use self-reports as to whether a person had a chronic disease within the previous 12 
months. 
To measure mental health, we employ self-reports about stress symptoms within the 
previous 12 months. Physical responses to stress can be reflected in a set of symptoms 










for the basic model is constructed based on the responses to a set of questions concerning 
whether the person had any symptoms of stress. To avoid difficulties with correspondence 
and to have a reasonable share of cases, all questions that measure any symptoms of stress 
(namely, frequent headaches and migraine, depression and anxiety, and hypertension) are 
aggregated into one category – stress symptoms – as the simple average of the three 
components. More detailed definitions of the health variables are given in Table A.1 in 
Appendix A. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
In line with the existing literature, a range of demographic and socio-economic 
variables is included as explanatory variables (gender, marital status, education, age and age 
squared, occupation, and income). We attempted to match the UHBS and RLMS variables as 
closely as possible. The full description and construction of the variables is presented in Table 
A.1. 
 
4.4 Preliminary analysis of the data 
Financial well-being 
Figure 3 presents the dynamics of the components of WB in Russia and Ukraine in 
2012-2016. While a comparison of Russia and Ukraine in terms of the absolute levels of these 
variables is not possible due to differences in the questions and methodologies used in the two 
surveys, an examination of the dynamics of the changes is very informative. In 2013-2016, all 
components of financial well-being deteriorated in both countries. In Ukraine, real income 
dropped by more than 30%, while in Russia it declined by 10%. At the same time, 2016 saw a 
slow recovery of household income in Ukraine, whereas in Russia the gradual decline 
continued, reflecting the effect of sanctions and a drop in oil prices that occurred in 2016. 










countries. While not directly comparable, it is nevertheless instructive to look at the levels of 
the FWB variables in Russia and Ukraine. In 2013, around 62% of the population in Ukraine 
and 90% of the population in Russia had a positive evaluation of their current financial well-
being (ability to make ends meet in Ukraine and satisfaction with current financial situation in 
Russia). In 2014 only 32% of Ukrainians reported the ability to make ends meet, which 
contrasts starkly with the situation in Russia, where 83% were able to make ends meet. It is 
also interesting to look at expectations about the future. This measure took a cliff edge dive in 
Ukraine in 2014 and slowly recovered in 2015-2016, while in Russia the decline was slow but 
took two years to recover even by a small amount in 2016. 
Health 
A preliminary inspection of health indicators in 2012-2016 (Figure 2) shows an 
increase in the share of population with stress symptoms in both countries in 2014-2016. This 
was preceded by a reduction in stress symptoms from 2012 to 2013. The same pattern is 
observed for the proportion of people with chronic diseases, albeit that the pattern is 
significantly more pronounced in Ukraine. The proportion of the Ukrainian population with 
chronic diseases increased from 44% in 2012 to 50% in 2016, while there were only small 
changes in the proportion of chronic diseases in Russia. 
 
<insert Figure 2 here> 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Effects of the conflict on FWB and health in Ukraine 
First, we estimate equation (1) for the Ukrainian sample that excludes the populations 











FWB, real income and health (physical and mental).12 The model is estimated by OLS with 
individual and household controls, and macro-regional and time fixed effects. Control 
variables include age, age squared, natural log of education, urban, divorced, widowed, 
married, family size, unemployed, retired, student, entrepreneur self-employed, and female. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in brackets. 
Column (1) reports point estimates of the coefficients of the model, with ability to 
make ends meet (‘AEM’) as the dependent variable. Comparing AEM before and during the 
conflict shows that it substantially worsened for all populations in Ukraine. Since the conflict 
started, 25 percentage points more people did not have enough money to cover their living 
costs or buy food. This effect did not vary significantly with distance, meaning that the impact 
of the conflict on the ability to make ends meet comes from the overall macroeconomic 
situation and has low regional variation. However, this may also be due to the fact that prior 
to the conflict, regions closer to Donbas were relatively better off than other regions of 
Ukraine, as the negative coefficient of the natural log of distance from Donbas indicates. 
It may be argued that the conflict mainly lowers the subjective components of FWB 
through the shock in real terms to the annual household income and that our results are 
affected by omitted variable bias. Column (2) reports the same regression using an additional 
control of the natural log of real annual household income. In this regression the impact of 
conflict on the whole population of Ukraine becomes insignificant. R-squared increases from 
6.6 to 14.1%. We conclude that the negative effect of the conflict on AEM is mostly 
channelled through the shock to the current income. 
At the same time the effect of the conflict on expectations about FWB, reported in 
columns (3) and (4), is much stronger for the whole population; we note a 70 percentage 
points higher share of people reporting that they have negative expectations about their future 
financial situation. However, expectations improve for those who live farther from the 
                                                            











conflict zone, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients of the interaction term 
between conflict and distance, with people who live 700 kilometres away from Donetsk being 
37% more likely to evaluate their future financial well-being positively. In column (4) we 
control for real income, and this does not change our results. It indicates that the effect of 
expectations about the future is not fully explained by the level of current income. 
Real total income (column 5) declined in all regions during the conflict since its start, 
but the decline was stronger in regions closer to Donbas.  Real household income dropped by 
more than 60% near the conflict zone, whereas 700 kilometres away the decline in real 
household income was nearly halved – at only 33%. 
 
<insert Table 1 here> 
 
Columns (6) and (7) of the table present the results for the health indicators. We did 
not find a statistically significant effect of the conflict on chronic diseases across the whole 
period of the conflict. Indeed, rather surprisingly, stress symptoms declined during the 
conflict for the population as a whole, although the Ukrainian population living farther away 
from the conflict reported feeling more stressed. This may occur because the population of the 
Western regions of Ukraine took a more active part in the protest movement and had more 
negative attitudes towards Russian involvement in the conflict due to a lower proportion of 
ethnic Russians in the population. Additionally, there was a higher probability of being 
drafted to the military in Western Ukraine, which caused widespread protests by residents in 
the Western regions in 2014 and 2015.13 
As for the other variables, we find that more educated people have a better evaluation 
of the components of FWB and better physical health (See Table A.2 in Appendix A). A 
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larger household size is associated with better subjective financial well-being. Retired 
individuals have lower FWB and poorer mental and physical health, while entrepreneurs 
report higher measures. While occupation may be an endogenous variable, for the period that 
is the subject of this study we assume that the shock of the military conflict was completely 
unexpected, so there is no reason to believe that people made those decisions taking into 
account the future conflict. Women evaluate their ability to make ends meet 2.4 percentage 
points poorer than men, and their expectations about their future FWB are 1.4 percentage 
points lower. Women also have a poorer evaluation of their health relative to men. 
 
5.2 Effect of the conflict on well-being in Russia 
Second, we estimated equation (1) using RLMS data for the European part of Russia 
(Central, North-Western, Southern, Volga and Ural Federal Districts) in 2013-2016. Panel B 
of Table 1 presents the estimates of the coefficients of interest for FWB (objective and 
subjective) and health (physical and mental). All estimated regressions have similar controls 
as in Panel A, including individual characteristics, and regional and year fixed effects. 
Reported standard errors are robust and clustered at the household level. 
FWB of the Russian population experienced a deterioration during the conflict, but not 
as severe as in Ukraine – there was a 20-21 percentage points reduction in expected FWB 
after the start of the conflict as opposed to 54-70 percentage points in Ukraine. Similar to the 
Ukrainian sample, the expected FWB of the population from regions closer to Donetsk 
experienced a larger and significant decline. However, we do not see the effect of the conflict 
on satisfaction with FWB or real income and health in Russia as coefficients for conflict, and 













5.3 Conflict and well-being in the Rostov region 
Due to Russia’s large size and the denial of direct involvement in the conflict by the 
Russian government, it is not surprising that the impact of the conflict on the well-being of 
the Russian population is not very strong. However, the Rostov region in Russia borders on 
both the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. During the period of heavy fighting, it was reported 
that some villages in the Rostov region were hit by artillery shells and at least one person 
died.14 Moreover, civilians in the Rostov region observed intensive movements of military 
troops and equipment. Finally, migration flows and cross-border human traffic between 
Russia and the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics significantly increased during the 
conflict. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the conflict had a stronger impact on the 
population in the Rostov region. 
 
<insert Table 2 here> 
 
To test this hypothesis, we estimated the equation (2) specification using the 
population of the Rostov region as the treated group. The regression model includes 
individual controls, and regional and time fixed effects. Controls are age, age squared, natural 
log of education, urban, divorced, widowed, married, family size, unemployed, retired, 
student, entrepreneur self-employed, female. We also control for the natural log of real 
income when we evaluate subjective FWB and health. 
The results are presented in Table 2. Since the conflict started, residents of Rostov 
were 16% more likely to have negative expectations about FWB and 9% more likely to be 
dissatisfied with their current FWB. The Rostov population also experienced an increase in 
stress symptoms by 2.4%, but there was no significant effect on chronic diseases. 
Interestingly, during the conflict the population of Rostov experienced an increase in real total 
                                                            











income of 7.2% relative to the populations in other regions of Russia. This may reflect an 
increase in public spending, channelled to the region due to increased military spending, and 
improvements in the infrastructure necessary to host military troops and equipment that were 
concentrated at the border with Ukraine. 
 
5.4 Dynamics of the impact of the conflict on FWB and health in Ukraine and Russia 
The conflict in Ukraine went through several stages. It started at the beginning of 2014 
as a low-scale military standoff. Then it escalated with a threat of full-scale Russian 
intervention and by the end of 2014/beginning of 2015, there was heavy fighting. The conflict 
continued through 2016 with low intensity fighting against the backdrop of the peace talks in 
Minsk. During this period, the economic situation in Ukraine had been worsening, seeing a 
slow recovery in 2016. Therefore, it is important to look at the dynamics of the changes in the 
components of well-being. 
Table 3 presents the results. Panel A is based on the Ukrainian sample and Panel B is 
based on the Russian sample. We first look at the dynamics of whether civilians were able to 
make ends meet. According to column (1) of Panel A, in Ukraine there was, relative to 2013, 
an increase of 35 percentage points (“p.p.”) in the number of people who had difficulties in 
making ends meet in 2014, with a farther 23 p.p. in 2015, and 4 p.p. in 2016. The interaction 
of the conflict with distance was positive and significant in 2014, becoming insignificant in 
2015 and 2016. This pattern corresponds well with the overall economic situation in Ukraine. 
The ability to make ends meet was at its lowest in 2014, especially near the conflict zone, 
meaning people did not have the resources to satisfy their basic needs. By 2016 the situation 
had improved considerably. Regarding expected future FWB in column (2), expectations 
bottomed out in 2015, but in 2016 people still evaluated future FWB negatively. 
We look at real income in column (3). Despite some improvements in the 











conflict zone (-57% in 2015 relative to 2012, and -75% in 2016), but there were signs of 
recovery farther away from the conflict, as indicated by a positive coefficient of the 
interaction term (0.037 in 2015 and 0.074 in 2016). This indicates that the negative economic 
effect of the conflict became more localized. By 2016 the situation with real income improved 
relative to 2014 in areas that were 300 kilometers or more from the conflict zone. 
The effect of distance from the conflict zone on mental health is seen to steadily 
weaken over time (column 4). The stress symptoms increased most strongly with distance in 
2014, which was the period of the heaviest fighting and uncertainty. By 2016, when the phase 
of heavy fighting was over, their significant impact on the remote areas decreased. However, 
the situation with chronic diseases was the opposite (column 5). This measure did not 
significantly deteriorate until 2016. Moreover, the increase in chronic diseases was more 
pronounced in regions closer to the conflict zone. Perhaps this pattern indicates that the effect 
of the conflict on physical health occurs with long lags, while mental health is impacted 
earlier and recovers more quickly as people adjust to the changing environment. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the dynamic effect results estimated on the Russian 
sample. Unlike the baseline results in Table 1, the results presented here give a more nuanced 
and interesting picture of the impact of the conflict on the population of Russia. The first year 
of conflict (2014) saw a deterioration in all components of FWB, with significant negative 
results for both satisfaction with current income and expectations about future FWB. The 
expectations were also negative and significant in 2015, while the effect on financial 
satisfaction was short-lived and quite shallow. The effect of the conflict on subjective FWB in 
2014 was significantly lower for people who lived farther from Donbas; however, this 
variation with distance disappeared in 2015 and 2016. Just as for the results in Panel B of 
Table 1, we did not find significant effects of the conflict on the health situation in Russia. 
 












5.5 Well-being of sub-samples of the population 
Populations with different levels of mobility at different stages of their life cycle may 
experience conflict differently. Table 4 reports the effect of the conflict on the financial well-
being of different age groups. First, ability to make ends meet suffered most for the younger 
population, perhaps due to the higher volatility of income for groups without the buffer of 
state pensions. Relatively older people of working age were also hard hit. The expected FWB 
of all age groups dropped significantly during the conflict. The group age 26-45 was the least 
affected, perhaps due to their higher mobility and a greater flexibility to adjust to the negative 
effect of the conflict. 
For the objective FWB, the conflict strongly influenced young and middle-aged 
people, with stronger effects being experienced closer to Donbas. The effect on the population 
aged 56 and older was less pronounced and did not depend on distance. This is likely related 
to the fact that work-related income is more volatile and more strongly influenced by 
proximity to the conflict, whereas state pensions are not contingent on geographical location 
and provide a measure of security against economic and political shocks. 
The older generation experienced a stronger impact of the conflict on health, 
especially on chronic diseases for the 56-65 year old, and on the mental health of people aged 
either 45-55 or older than 66 who lived far from the conflict zone. The effect on younger 
people was mostly not significant. 
Table 5 reports the effect of the conflict on well-being by level of education and 
gender. The financial well-being of the population with only a primary level of education was 
largely not significantly affected by the conflict, while more educated people suffered losses, 
which significantly increased for the population living near the conflict zone. Interestingly, 
the group with secondary education was the most affected. Perhaps this is related to the fact 











other types of occupations, making this group less mobile than people with higher levels of 
education. 
While the effect of the conflict on the ability to make ends meet is quite similar for 
males and females, females experience a stronger negative effect on expectations about the 
future, but those negative effects improve faster with distance from the conflict zone. At the 
same time, males experienced an increase in mental health problems, which were stronger for 
individuals who lived closer to the conflict zone. 
 
<insert Tables 4 and 5 here> 
 
5.6 Common trend test 
For the DD methodology to provide a valid inference, we need to maintain the 
common trend assumption. For the regression model specification, as seen in column (3) of 
Table 3 with the natural log of real total household income in 2012-2016, we carried out a 
check for whether this assumption holds.15 Our focus was on the behaviour of the variable 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡 ×  𝑙𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑟), where t=2013, 2014, 2015, 2016. We expected that the 
interaction term coefficient for t=2013 would be insignificant, because the conflict only 
started in 2014. We also report our 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑡 coefficients to show the annual trend in total 
household income in 2013-2016 relative to 2012. 
The results in column (3) of Panel A in Table 3 show that real total household income 
declined in Ukraine during the conflict in 2014-2016, with no statistically significant 
differences between 2012 and 2013. More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is not significant for 2013, but turns positive and significant for 2014-2016. This indicates that 
before the conflict, regions that are more proximate to the Donbas region showed no 
                                                            












difference in the total household income variable, but during the conflict their total household 
income deteriorated, more so than in the remoter regions. 
For the Russian sample, presented in Panel B of Table 3, we can test for the common 
trend for all variables. We cannot reject the common trends for subjective FWB measures – 
satisfaction with FWB and expected FWB. We also cannot reject the common trend 
assumptions for the health indicators. At the same time, we reject the common trend 
hypothesis for real income. However, we are less concerned by this fact, given that we did not 
find that war impacted real incomes in Russia. 
The results of the common trend test for the Rostov region versus the rest of Russia 
are presented in Table A.3 in Appendix A. The results indicate that the Rostov region did not 
have a significantly different trend in FWB before the start of the conflict. However, the 
situation changed in 2014-2016, when the population in the region experienced a considerable 
deterioration in their expectations about future FWB, owing to the proximity of the region to 
the conflict zone. 
 
5.7 Placebo test 
We ran a placebo test to make sure that our identification strategy is sound. We 
measured the distance from the Ukrainian regions to Minsk, the capital of Belarus, which is 
located far from the conflict zone. There were no military actions near the Belarus-Ukrainian 
border. Moreover, the distance from Minsk to the Ukrainian regions is not collinear to the 
distance to Donetsk, being located at a higher latitude.  
The results of the placebo test are presented in Table 6. Panel A presents the results 
for the Ukrainian sample. Most of the interaction terms are insignificant, indicating that since 
the start of the conflict, the well-being and health of Ukrainians were not related to their 
distance from Minsk. However, the interaction term of distance from Minsk and conflict has a 










there is a different dynamic of expected FWB between the northern and southern parts of 
Ukraine. For the Russian sample, the results of the placebo test are presented in Panel B of 
Table 6. We found no significant effects for all measures, thereby indicating that the results 
are not driven by some unobserved factors. 
 
<insert Table 6 here> 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the contemporaneous effect of armed conflict from both sides, 
namely the country that encourages and supports the conflict and the country where it takes 
place. Unlike Coupe and Obrizan (2016b), we found that the conflict influenced the well-
being of the population outside of the conflict zone, with the impact being felt not only in 
Ukraine, but also in bordering regions of Russia. We noted two opposing partial effects: (i) a 
decrease in financial well-being with distance; and (ii) an increase in mental stress with 
distance, which may have cancelled each other out in the measurement of overall happiness 
that was recorded by Coupe and Obrizan (2016b). The difference could also be related to the 
fact that we use a regionally representative survey for Ukraine, while Coupe and Obrizan rely 
on the nationally representative sample. 
We found that the conflict negatively affects the domains of well-being mainly 
through a deterioration in the expectations about future financial well-being. The strength and 
duration of the effect in the two countries differs. In Russia, it mostly disappeared after the 
first year of the conflict, when a full-scale conflict between Russia and Ukraine was viewed as 
a possibility, while in Ukraine it remained significant during the whole period. The intensity 
was inversely related to distance from the conflict zone. 
Our results suggest that the negative effect of the conflict on financial well-being goes 











means. This is consistent with previous research (Solberg et al., 2002). The ability of 
Ukrainians to make ends meet was at its worst in 2014, when the objective measure of FWB 
had only started to decline. In 2016, when the real household income was still at its minimum, 
we observed that people evaluated AEM more positively relative to 2014. 
The impact of the conflict on health shows a rather mixed picture. We did not find that 
the conflict affected physical health in Russia, while in Ukraine, the conflict affected chronic 
diseases only in the last year of our sample. The effect of the conflict on mental health in 
Ukraine was more significant farther away from the conflict zone, while in Russia we found 
an increase in stress symptoms near the Ukrainian border only in the Rostov region. This 
suggests that the effect on mental health does not necessarily vary with distance but may 
change with a difference in exposure to mass media and social networks, or with cultural 
differences (i.e. language) or ethnic groups. 
Based on our results, we can offer several policy implications. First, the effect of the 
conflict on expectations is very strong and persistent. Therefore, the management of 
expectations and a reduction in uncertainty through timely, transparent and trustworthy 
information should be a government priority during a conflict. Second, the delayed negative 
response of the population’s physical health to the conflict highlights that the government 
should develop a programme of preventive actions, which would help to tackle these 
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Figure 1. Growth of GDP per capita in Russia and Ukraine in 2010-2016 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
per capita is based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. 






























Appendix B: Distance to Donbas and pro-Russian support 
Figure A.1 plots the proportion of ethnic Russians (Ukrainian 2001 census data) 
against the distance to Donbas as well as presenting a quadratic polynomial fit as a solid line. 
There is a strong negative correlation between the distance to Donbas and the share of ethnic 
Russians in the regions of Ukraine. It explains why there was more support to the Donbas 
rebels in Eastern Ukraine relative to Central and Western Ukraine. It also hints at the 
possibility that the impact of military conflict on mental health may be stronger further away 

















Figure A.1. Percentage of ethnic Russians and distance from Donbas 
 
Source: Data on percent of ethnic Russians within a region are from the 2001 census. The 
distances of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions to the conflict zone are set equal to zero. The 
distances to the other regions are measured by distances of administrative capitals from 
Donetsk. The fitted line is the second order polynomial regression of the percentage on 

















Table 1. Impact of conflict on components of WB and income in Ukraine and Russia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Ability to 
make ends 
meet 
+ real income Expected 
FWB 







 A. Main results Ukraine 
        
Conflict -.255*** -.044 -.705*** -.539*** -.591*** -.052*** .111** 
  (.080) (.077) (.075) (.075) (.060) (.015) (.052) 
Ln Distance -.166*** -.189*** -.152*** -.148*** .067*** -.007** .105*** 
 (.018) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.014) (.003) (.012) 
Ln Distance x .020 .006 .057*** .050*** .039*** .008*** -.010 
Conflict (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.009) (.002) (.008) 
Ln real total 
income 
 .357***  .052***  -.004*** .045*** 
  (.007)  (.007)  (.001) (.005) 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60715 60715 59394 59394 60715 60755 60755 
R2 .066 .141 .099 .127 .540 .374 .324 
        
 Satisfaction 
with FWB 










 B. Main results Russia 
  
Conflict -.031 -.014 -.206*** -.214** .002 .027 .005 
 (.086) (.084) (.067) (.068) (.110) (.036) (.022) 
Ln Distance  -.022 -.066*** .103*** .099*** .182*** .012* .031*** 
 (.016) (.016) (.012) (.012) (.020) (.006) (.004) 
Ln Distance  -.006 -.006 .023** .025** -.016 -.003 -.001 
x Conflict (.012) (.012) (.009) (.009) (.016) (.005) (.003) 










        
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45810 44060 45810 44060 44060 44060 44060 
R2 .041 .075 .044 .046 .431 .278 .122 
        
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in brackets. 
All models include individual controls, and regional and year fixed effects. Control variables include 
age, age squared, natural log of education, urban, divorced, widowed, married, family size, unemployed, 













Table 2. Conflict, FWB and health in Rostov 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Satisfaction 
FWB 






Conflict -.069*** -.038*** -.115*** .007** -.006** 
 (.008) (.005) (.010) (.004) (.002) 
Rostov .046 -.144*** -.339*** -.022* -.028*** 
 (.040) (.031) (.041) (.013) (.008) 
Rostov x Conflict -.087** -.160*** .072* .024* .012 
 (.041) (.038) (.040) (.013) (.008) 
Region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45894 45894 44144 44144 44144 
R2 .057 .078 .501 .292 .135 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in brackets. 
All models include individual controls, regional and time fixed effects. Control variables include age, age 
squared, natural log of education, urban, divorced, widowed, married, family size, unemployed, retired, 













Table 3. Dynamics of FWB and its components in 2013-2016 in Ukraine and Russia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










 A. Results for Ukraine 
Indicator for 2013   .040   
   (.069)   
Indicator for 2014 -.354*** -.675*** -.264*** -.065*** .017 
 (.096) (.091) (.074) (.018) (.064) 
Indicator for 2015 -.233** -.852*** -.574*** -.051*** .096 
 (.098) (.095) (.074) (.019) (.064) 
Indicator for 2016 -.040 -.442*** -.749*** -.040** .178*** 
 (.106) (.103) (.078) (.020) (.069) 
Ln distance from    .004   
Donetsk and 2013   (.011)   
Ln distance from  .045*** .034** .025** .010*** -.002 
Donetsk and 2014 (.015) (.014) (.011) (.003) (.010) 
Ln distance from  .019 .087*** .037*** .008*** -.010 
Donetsk and 2015 (.015) (.015) (.012) (.003) (.010) 
Ln distance from  -.013 .033** .074*** .006** -.020* 
Donetsk and 2016 (.016) (.016) (.012) (.003) (.011) 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60715 59394 77464 60755 60755 
R2 .067 .126 .539 .374 .324 
      
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Satisfaction 
FWB 
Expected FWB Real income Stress symptoms 
 B. Results for Russia 
Indicator for 2013 -.138 .069 -.241* -.017 
 (.102) (.074) (.144) (.043) 
Indicator for 2014 -.204* -.342*** -.119 .031 
 (.106) (.092) (.155) (.044) 
Indicator for 2015 -.103 -.183* -.204 -.024 
 (.105) (.094) (.150) (.042) 
Indicator for 2016 -.109 .037 -.233 .018 
 (.101) (.089) (.148) (.042) 
Ln distance from  .017 -.011 .038* .003 
Donetsk and 2013 (.014) (.010) (.020) (.006) 
Ln distance from  .026* .035*** .023 -.004 
Donetsk and 2014 (.015) (.013) (.022) (.006) 
Ln distance from  .006 .014 .022 .005 
Donetsk and 2015 (.015) (.013) (.021) (.006) 
Ln distance from  .003 -.013 .022 -.001 
Donetsk and 2016 (.014) (.012) (.021) (.006) 
Region  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 59463 59463 57075 57075 
R2 .043 .046 .428 .274 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at family level are in brackets. 
All models include individual controls and regional fixed effects. Control variables include age, age 























Table 4. Components of financial well-being, conflict and age in Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (4) 
 Age 16-25 Age 26-35 Age 36-45 Age 46-55 Age 56-65 Age 66 and 
more 
A. Ability to make ends meet       
Conflict -.432** -.310* -.128 -.384*** -.041 -.198 
 (.181) (.163) (.155) (.148) (.152) (.147) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .052* .032 .001 .042* -.016 .005 
 (.028) (.025) (.024) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
Observations 6643 9360 10123 10873 11012 10990 
R2 .044 .049 .058 .069 .081 .073 
B. Expected FWB       
Conflict -.611*** -.430*** -.507*** -.804*** -.505*** -.599*** 
 (.167) (.152) (.150) (.136) (.142) (.143) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .065** .036 .047** .085*** .037* .055** 
 (.025) (.023) (.023) (.021) (.022) (.022) 
Observations 6472 9138 9857 10643 10808 10807 
R2 .137 .129 .115 .131 .139 .122 
C. Ln Real total income       
Conflict -.579*** -.659*** -.642*** -.716*** -.407*** -.457*** 
 (.145) (.126) (.122) (.112) (.105) (.093) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .038* .050*** .049*** .060*** .008 .019 
 (.022) (.019) (.019) (.017) (.016) (.014) 
Observations 6643 9360 10123 10873 11012 10990 
R2 .490 .374 .424 .491 .593 .675 
       
D. Chronic disease       
Conflict -.059 -.047 .233* .111 .337** -.086 
 (.111) (.103) (.129) (.138) (.134) (.099) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .009 .010 -.032 -.008 -.039* .024 
 (.017) (.016) (.020) (.021) (.021) (.015) 
Observations 6682 9440 9982 11035 10899 10946 
R2 .058 .088 .072 .077 .053 .040 
E. Stress symptoms       
Conflict -.002 -.026 -.044* -.083** -.015 -.119** 
 (.013) (.018) (.027) (.035) (.042) (.049) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .000 .003 .006 .012** .003 .019*** 
 (.002) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.007) 
Observations 6682 9440 9982 11035 10899 10946 
R2 .091 .141 .210 .291 .297 .209 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at family level are in brackets. 
All models include individual controls, regional and time fixed effects. Control variables include age, age 
squared, natural log of education, urban, divorced, widowed, married, family size, unemployed, retired, student, 











Table 5. Well-being, conflict, gender and education in Ukraine 
 Education  Gender 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
 High Secondary Primary   Female Male 
A. Ability to make ends meet       
Conflict -.254** -.250** -.151  -.231** -.285** 
 (.102) (.102) (.353)  (.107) (.119) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .018 .020 .000  .015 .025 
 (.016) (.016) (.053)  (.017) (.018) 
Observations 26743 32282 1690  31078 28314 
R2 .067 .059 .066  .171 .151 
B. Expected FS       
Conflict -.457*** -.665*** -.242  -.653*** -.481*** 
 (.098) (.094) (.347)  (.103) (.109) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .034** .068*** .004  .064*** .040** 
 (.015) (.014) (.052)  (.016) (.017) 
Observations 26144 31610 1640  31080 28314 
R2 .130 .127 .114  .126 .129 
C. Ln real total income       
Conflict -.581*** -.549*** -.900***  -.522*** -.680*** 
 (.078) (.077) (.218)  (.080) (.089) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .034*** .035*** .090***  .030** .050*** 
 (.012) (.012) (.033)  (.012) (.013) 
Observations 26743 32282 1690  31719 28996 
R2 .505 .564 .710  .582 .455 
D. Chronic disease       
Conflict -.006 .208*** .080  .126* .103 
 (.076) (.070) (.243)  (.070) (.079) 
Ln Distance*Conflict .006 -.022** -.000  -.012 -.008 
 (.012) (.011) (.037)  (.011) (.012) 
Observations 26686 32381 1688  31406 29349 
R2 .302 .332 .081  .359 .282 
E. Stress symptoms       
Conflict .002 .008 -.061  -.013 .020* 
 (.012) (.012) (.062)  (.013) (.011) 
Ln Distance*Conflict -.000 -.001 .010  .002 -.003* 
 (.002) (.002) (.009)  (.002) (.002) 
Observations 26686 32381 1688  31406 29349 
R2 .009 .012 .049  .012 .010 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at family level are in brackets. 
All models include regional and time fixed effects. Primary education is less than 9 years of schooling. 
Secondary education is from 9 to 11 year and high education is above of 11 years. Control variables include 
age, age squared, natural log of education, urban, divorced, widowed, married, family size, unemployed, retired, 













Table 6. Placebo test 
 A. Placebo test. Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
















        
Ln Distance from 
















Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60715 60715 59394 59394 60715 60755 60755 
R2 .069 .142 .127 .129 .538 .136 .401 
 B. Placebo test. Russia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Satisfaction 
with FWB 










        
Ln Distance 
















Region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45810 44060 45810 44060 44060 44060 44060 
R2 .482 .473 .361 .362 .542 .241 .145 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at family level are in brackets. 
All models include individual controls, regional and time fixed effects, control variables such as age, age2, female, 














Appendix A: Tables 
Table A.1. Dependent and independent variables 
Variable Measure Value Source 
A. Financial well-being 
Current FS: 
   
Ability to make 
ends meet 
How do you evaluate the level of your income 
during this year?  
1 was enough/could buy 





How satisfied are you with your economic 
conditions at the present time? 
1 if satisfied 0 otherwise RLMS 
Future FS: 
 
   
Expectation 
How do you think will your financial situation 
change in the next 12 month? 
1 if not get worse or 
much worse 0 otherwise 
UHBS 
 
Do you think that in the next 12 months you and 




   
 
Do you have any chronic diseases (more than 6 
month)? 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
UHBS 
 
Do you have any kind of chronic illness? RLMS 
Stress symptoms: 
  
  Depression or 
anxiety
Did you feel depression or anxiety (during the 
last 12 month)?  
1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
UHBS 
 
In the last 12 months have you had a serious 
nervous disorder or depression? 
RLMS 
 Headache and 
migraine
Did you feel frequent headache and migraine 
(during the last 12 month)? 
UHBS 
 Hypertension
Did you have hypertension (during the last 12 
month)? 
UHBS/RLMS 
C. Treatment group variables 
Ln (Dist_Donetsk)  
Natural log of kilometres from Donetsk to 24 






Population from the regions bordering Donetsk 
and Lugansk oblast 1 if person lives in such 
region and 0 otherwise 
Google 
Maps 
Rostov Population from the Rostov 
 
Conflict Dummy for the years of the conflict 
1 if year is greater of 
equal to 2014 and 0 
otherwise 
 
Ln (Real total 
income) 
Natural log of total household income adjusted 
for inflation 
Annual, UAH of 2012 UHBS 













Table A.2. Financial well-being and conflict in Donbas – Baseline results 
 (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Ability to 
make ends 
meet 






Conflict -.255*** -.591*** -.052*** .111** 
 (.080) (.075) (.060) (.015) (.052) 
Ln Distance x .020 .057*** .039*** .008*** -.010 
Conflict (.012) (.012) (.009) (.002) (.008) 
Ln Distance -.166*** -.152*** .067*** -.007** .105*** 
 (.018) (.017) (.014) (.003) (.012) 
Age/10 -.013 -.032*** .023*** -.003 .149*** 
 (.008) (.008) (.007) (.002) (.006) 
Age2/100 .003*** .003*** .001** .001*** -.005*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) 
Ln Education .183*** .035*** .264*** .003 -.032*** 
 (.010) (.009) (.008) (.003) (.007) 
Urban -.047*** -.054*** -.025*** .000 .035*** 
 (.006) (.006) (.005) (.001) (.004) 
Divorced -.052*** -.007 -.194*** .003 -.030*** 
 (.010) (.010) (.009) (.002) (.009) 
Widow/   -.029*** .014 -.207*** .027*** -.012 
widower (.011) (.011) (.009) (.003) (.008) 
Married .033*** .024*** .019** .002 -.056*** 
 (.009) (.009) (.008) (.002) (.006) 
HH size .029*** .005* .211*** .000 -.020*** 
 (.003) (.003) (.002) (.000) (.002) 
Unemployed -.138*** -.023*** -.209*** -.005*** -.006 
 (.008) (.008) (.007) (.001) (.006) 
Retired -.134*** -.050*** -.173*** .013*** .252*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.007) 
Student .025** .042*** -.060*** .006*** .015* 
 (.012) (.012) (.010) (.001) (.008) 
Entrepreneur .200*** .046 .264*** -.001 -.081*** 
 (.021) (.029) (.032) (.005) (.023) 
Self- -.094*** -.012 .035*** -.006** .025** 
employed (.014) (.014) (.012) (.003) (.012) 
Female -.024*** -.014** -.053*** .006*** .022*** 
 (.006) (.006) (.005) (.001) (.004) 
Log of real     -.004*** .045*** 
total income    (.001) (.005) 
Chronic    .145***  
Disease    (.001)  
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60715 59394 60715 60755 60755 










Table A.3. Dynamic of FWB and stress symptoms in Rostov region during the conflict 
 (2)  (4) (5) (6) 




Indicator for 2013 -.016** -.011** .036*** .003 
 (.007) (.005) (.010) (.003) 
Indicator for 2014 -.016** -.088*** .042*** .005 
 (.008) (.006) (.011) (.004) 
Indicator for 2015 -.062*** -.080*** -.052*** .009*** 
 (.008) (.005) (.011) (.004) 
Indicator for 2016 -.086*** -.051*** -.080*** .009*** 
 (.007) (.005) (.011) (.004) 
Rostov x 2013 .031 .038 -.031 -.015 
 (.051) (.045) (.064) (.016) 
Rostov x 2014 -.082 -.099* .032 .008 
 (.053) (.053) (.073) (.015) 
Rostov x 2015 -.048 -.194*** .038 -.008 
 (.053) (.053) (.065) (.015) 
Rostov x 2016 -.024 -.065 .058 .024 
 (.049) (.052) (.064) (.016) 
Rostov .014 -.179*** -.317*** -.015 
 (.040) (.034) (.058) (.013) 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 59547 59547 57159 57159 
R2 .063 .082 .498 .288 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors clustered at the family level are in brackets. 
All models include individual controls, regional and time fixed effects. Controls variables include age, age 
squared, natural log of education, urban, divorced, widow, married, family size, unemployed, retired, 
student, entrepreneur self-employed, female, natural log of income for components of subjective FWB 
and health. 
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